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NUCLEAR POWER: RISK, LIABILITY, 
AND INDEMNITY 
Harold P. Green* 
IN 1946, the Congress of the United States enacted the original Atomic Energy Act1 as the framework for development, control, 
and use of atomic energy. This Act provided for the transfer to the 
new Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), a civilian agency, of the 
entire atomic energy program which to that point had been con-
ducted by the Manhattan Engineer District, a creature of the United 
States Army. The Act contemplated that the heart of the nuclear 
technology-the production of special nuclear material2 and the 
use of special nuclear material in both military and civil applica-
tions-would be a government monopoly. All special nuclear ma-
terial in existence and to come into existence was to be owned by 
the government, and private persons were prohibited from owning 
or possessing special nuclear material and facilities for producing or 
utilizing special nuclear material. 
Although the AEC, acting under the 1946 Act, was primarily 
concerned with the development of nuclear technology for military 
purposes, it also undertook research and development in connection 
with peaceful uses of the technology, including nuclear power. Al-
most all of such research and development took place at the AEC's 
government-owned installations at geographically isolated sites. 
The Atomic Energy Act of 19543 revised and superseded the 
1946 Act. The basic premises of the 1946 Act and the statutory 
prohibitions against private production, possession, and use of special 
nuclear material were abandoned. It was now possible for private 
persons to construct, own, and operate nuclear reactors for produc-
tion of industrial heat and electric power and for other peaceful 
• Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law Center. A.B. 1942, 
J.D. 1948, University of Chicago.-Ed. 
I. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755. 
2, "Special nuclear material" is the term of art used in the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 to describe material capable of releasing substantial quantities of energy in the 
course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(c), 2014(aa), 2071 
(1970). In more practical terms, special nuclear material encompasses the fuel used in 
nuclear reactors and the material that through the process of fission results in the 
detonation of atomic weapons. Such material was described in the 1946 Act as "fission-
able material." Use of the term "special nuclear material" in the 1954 Act was intended 
to broaden the scope of protected materials to include fusionable as well as fissionable 
materials. 
l!. Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 
(1970). 
[479] 
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purposes; such activities, however, were subject to a stringent 
federal licensing scheme, administered by the AEC and designed pri-
marily to protect the health and safety of the public against the 
radiation hazards of the new technology.4 
This 180 degree tum in the basic national policy with respect to 
atomic energy was prompted by a number of factors. By 1954, it had 
become clear that the "secrets" of atomic energy were readily avail-
able to other nations. Britain and the Soviet Union had developed 
nuclear weapons, and both had the capability for developing peace-
ful uses of atomic energy. Within the United States, AEC research 
and development had expanded nuclear reactor technology to the 
point at which civilian nuclear power seemed to be an imminent 
reality. Privately owned utilities and industrial concerns were clam-
oring for the opportunity to invest their own funds in the develop-
ment and exploitation of nuclear technology. Economic policy ques-
tions were raised as to whether atomic energy, which was almost 
certainly a basic industry of the immediate future, should remain 
an "island of socialism" in our free enterprise, competitive national 
economy. Finally, faced with a race with other nations for develop-
ment of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, it was believed that the 
goal of atomic power at competitive prices would be reached more 
quickly if "cost-cutting and other incentives of free and competitive 
enterprise"5 were substituted for development solely under govern-
ment auspices. 
With enactment of the 1954 Act there was a rush of private 
industrial and business interest and activity into atomic energy 
technology. This was, however, only an ephemeral phenomenon. 
Faced with the hard economic facts, many firms that had expressed 
an interest and taken the plunge soon concluded that merely break-
ing even, let alone making a profit, lay in the relatively remote and 
uncertain future. The absence of short-term profit potential, coupled 
with the necessity for reliance on the AEC for special nuclear ma-
terial for use as fuel and essential materials and services, quickly 
chilled the enthusiasm of private enterprise. To create a more 
favorable financial environment, the AEC offered various forms of 
economic incentives and inducements to spur private investment.6 
4. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2073-78, 2131-40 (1970). 
5. H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954). These factors are discussed in 
President Eisenhower's message to Congress (H.R. Doc. No. 328, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1954)) recommending enactment of the legislation and in the report of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy on the legislation. H.R. REP. No. 2181, supra. 
6. See Green, The Strange Case of Nuclear Power, 17 FED. B.J. 100 (1957); Morrisson, 
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Notwithstanding these subsidy-type programs, a major roadblock re-
mained, primarily in the nuclear power segment of the industry. 
This obstacle was the problem of potential public liability: the re-
mote possibility of an accident that could result in damages giving 
rise to public liability claims of astronomic proportions. The road-
block was removed in 1957 through enactment of the Price-Anderson 
Act,7 a much discussed but little understood (in its policy bases and 
implications) and unique approach to technological advance in the 
public interest. 
I. EvoLUTION OF THE PRICE-ANDERSON Acrr OF 1957 
The problem of potential liability can be described simply. The 
major hazard in the operation of nuclear power plants is in the ac-
cumulation of radioactive wastes known as "fission products" in the 
reactor as it is operated. The fuel elements in which the accumula-
tion occurs are periodically removed for reprocessing and replaced. 
So long as the fission products are contained in the reactor, there is 
no possibility of catastrophic accident. If, however, an accident 
were to occur resulting in release of the fission products into the en-
vironment, the damage caused could be enormous because of their 
long-lived toxicity; fission products are more toxic per unit weight 
than any other industrially known material by a factor of a million 
to a billion.8 The extent of the damages caused would tum upon 
three factors: the quantity of fission products released, the prevail-
ing meteorological conditions that control the dispersal of the 
released products, and the demographical and geographical charac-
teristics of the area into which the products are dispersed. 
Clearly, the industry recognizes the hazards of nuclear tech-
nology. Great care is taken in designing, constructing, and operating 
nuclear power plants, and the AEC licensing and regulatory pro-
gram that involves multiple levels of independent safety review is 
extremely stringent. Nevertheless, in 1956 and 1957 the nuclear 
power industry was not prepared to proceed on the assumption that 
Federal Support of Domestic Atomic Power Development-The Policy Issues, 12 VAND, 
L. REv. 195 (1958). 
7. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 
(1970)). The legislation was cosponsored by Congressman Melvin Price (D., Ill.) and 
Senator Clinton Anderson (D., N.M.), both of whom were senior members (Senator 
Anderson was then Chairman) of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 
8. Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy on Government Indemnity 
for Private Licensees and AEC Contractors Against Reactor Hazards, 84th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 47 (1956) (testimony of C. Rogers McCullough) [hereinafter 1956 Indemnity Hear-
ings]. 
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such an accident-involving a new technology with many unknowns 
not yet proved in the crucible of experience and subject to the 
vagaries of human fallibility-would not occur.9 
Although the risk of a serious accident was generally regarded 
as extremely remote-infinitesimally small, some said-there was 
great concern about the enormous, indeed astronomical, damage 
that might result in the event such an accident in fact occurred. De-
spite this concern, there was a considerable reluctance on the part of 
industry spokesmen, AEC officials, and members of the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy to quantify the potential damages in 
dollar terms. Industry spokesmen preferred to relate the magnitude 
of such damages to the assets or net worth of their companies. The 
reluctance to estimate specifically the potential damages is illus-
trated in the following colloquy between Joint Committee Chair-
man Anderson and Charles J. Haugh, who appeared on behalf of the 
Association 0£ Casualty and Surety Companies. Mr. Haugh had 
referred to a statement by AEC Commissioner Libby referring to 
"the very remote event that we had a horrible catastrophe and a 







But that damage was only about $200 mil-
lion. 
[!']here are various opinions and various 
estimates that have been made ... as to the 
possible, not probable, sir, but possible, costs, 
under the most favorable conditions. I hesi-
tate on all of this, because apparently the 
only thing that appeals to the press is big 
figures, and it gets out and sounds as if we 
thought these things were going to blow up 
by the dozen. 
. . . You say estimates have been proposed. 
That is right, 
I do know some other estimates have been 
proposed, and one of them was shown to me, 
but shown to me in such a fashion that I 
must not reveal it, or talk about it. 
That must have been the same one I saw, 
sir. 
9. As one utility executive stated: 
We have hoped that we could be assured that the risk was too remote to be 
considered. But we have not found a single expert who is willing to say that, 
within a period of years of actual experience, the hazard, although extremely 
remote, can be ignored. 
Id, at 240 (testimony of Willis Gale, Chairman, Commonwealth Edison Co.). 
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Yes. Do you not think it would be nice if 
we got that thing in the record someplace? 
I am under the same wraps that you are .•.• 
This has nothing to do with "Q" clearance. 
This one I saw was by an organization that 
just said, ''We do not want to sponsor this, 
but we think the damage can run to $5 bil-
lion .... " It was a composite of a hundred 
guesses. And it would be interesting if we 
could put that in the record, but nobody 
wants to put in the record the basis.11 
Specific figures finally emerged with the release in 1957 of a 
study prepared for the AEC by its Brookhaven National Labora-
tory.12 The Brookha:ven Report concluded that in the event of a 
serious accident (in a nuclear power plant of the general type then 
contemplated at a typical location) resulting in release of all accum-
ulated fission products as many as 3,400 people might be killed; as 
many as 43,000 people might be injured; and as much as 7 billion 
dollars in property damage might result, largely from long-term 
land contamination.13 It must be understood, however, that these 
figures were based on extreme assumptions involving combinations 
of circumstances that are regarded as incredible by knowledgeable 
experts. But it is clear from testimony on the Price-Anderson Act 
that even industry spokesmen visualized the possibility of liability 
substantially in excess of 500 million dollars.14 
Ordinarily, business enterprises whose activities may result in 
public liability seek protection in the form of liability insurance. 
Unfortunately, however, the problem was beyond the capability of 
the insurance industry for two principal reasons. First, the insurance 
companies had no experience with the risks of nuclear reactors. 
Second, the amount of the potential liability was many orders of 
magnitude beyond the capacity of the insurance industry.11i Never-
theless, insurance companies were not prepared to accept the pros-
II. Id. at 158-59, 
12. AEC, THE THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS IN 
LARGE NUCLEAR PowER PLANTS (1957) (published under the designation WASH-740) 
[hereinafter Brookhaven Report]. A letter from Harold S. Vance, Acting AEC Chair-
man, that summarized the conclusions of the study was included in the Joint Commit-
tee's report on the Price-Anderson bill. H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 81-34 
(1957) [hereinafter Vance letter]. See note 65 infra and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of this report and a 1965 updating exercise, 
13. Vance letter, supra note 12, at 32-33, 
14. See 1956 Indemnity Hearings, supra note 8, at 122-24 (testimony of Charles H. 
Weaver, Vice President, Westinghouse Electric Co.). 
15. See id. 
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pect of a system of government insurance devised so as to freeze 
them out of a potentially lucrative type of business. Accordingly, it 
was made known during legislative consideration of the Price-An-
derson Act that the private insurance industry would be able to 
offer liability coverage in an amount ranging from 50 million dollars 
to 65 million dollars.16 Insurance spokesmen stated that this would 
be four times greater than any public liability policy previously 
available to any single American industrial plant.17 Indeed, it was 
pointed out that requests for coverage in excess of IO million dollars 
were very rare.18 Even this unprecedented amount of coverage was, 
however, regarded as inadequate by the atomic energy industry. 
During the legislative consideration of the Price-Anderson Act, 
it also became clear that the nuclear industry regarded the insurance 
problem as a "roadblock" to private development of nuclear power 
technology. Utilities and equipment suppliers that had taken the 
lead in nuclear power projects were publicly expressing their in-
ability or reluctance to risk their solvency, all the assets of their 
stockholders, and the very existence of their companies on the re-
mote possibility of a major nuclear catastrophe that was insurable 
to only a limited extent.19 The AEC itself had previously charac-
terized the insurance issue as "serious" and expressed doubt "that 
this problem can remain unresolved for a period of two or three 
years without impeding the construction and operation of privately 
operated nuclear power reactors."20 
Even the staging of the public hearings involved some difficult 
problems for the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the AEC.21 
A major difficulty was that the insurance problem cut across the basic 
political issue regarding the respective roles of private investment 
and government investment in nuclear power technology.22 Republi-
16. Id. at 5, 146. 
17. Id. at 5. 
18. Id. at 146. 
19. Willis Gale, Chairman, Commonwealth Edison Co.: "At this time we do not 
see any sound basis on which we can risk our solvency on the possibility, remote as it 
may be, of a major nuclear catastrophe." Id. at 240. Charles H. Weaver, Vice President, 
Westinghouse Electric Co.: "Obviously, we cannot risk the financial stability of our 
company for a relatively small project •••• [W]e cannot exclude the possibility that 
a great enough fool aided by a great enough conspiracy of circumstances, could bring 
about an accident exceeding available insurance." Id. at 110, 114-15. 
20. Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., Forum Memo, March 1956, at 11. 
21. Two months prior to commencement of the public hearings in May 1956, the 
Joint Committee had called a "seminar" of some forty persons representing AEC, equip-
ment suppliers, utilities and insurance companies to discuss the problem. The seminar 
"increased the desire" of the Committee to find some solution. H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1957). 
22. For the political history of the Gore-Holifield and Price-Anderson bills, see 
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can members of the Joint Committee, consistent with the Administra-
tion's position, urged that the job be left primarily in the hands of 
private enterprise. Democratic members were pressing to accelerate 
the nuclear power program through enactment of the Gore-Holifield 
bill,23 which called for investment of public funds in several demon-
stration plants to be owned and operated by the AEC. The asserted 
necessity for a commitment of federal resources to underwrite 
potential liability of private industry made it possible for the Demo-
crats to argue that if industry required a subsidy or government 
assumption of risk, perhaps the government should enjoy all of the 
benefits of ownership. 
A second and more serious difficulty lay in convincing Congress 
that the government "backstop" was necessary. Stated simply, the 
dilemma was that the legislation sought could be justified only upon 
a showing that nuclear power involved extraordinary risk. Yet, to 
demonstrate this extraordinary risk would tend to frighten the 
public and the Congress-and perhaps lead to delays in the develop-
ment and use of nuclear technology. 
The final dilemma in presentation of the issue at the Joint Com-
mittee hearings involved the relative importance of the two objec-
tives of the legislation: (I) to eliminate the liability roadblock to 
private development of nuclear power, and (2) to provide assurance 
that the public would be compensated for losses resulting from a 
serious accident. The initial indemnity bill submitted by the AEC24 
stressed the former objective. As an AEC official testified: "[W]e 
have not approached this from the standpoint of disaster insurance 
to protect the public ... we are trying to remove a roadblock that 
has been said to interfere with people getting into this program . 
• • .''21l The general view of the AEC was that its safety review pro-
cedures were adequate to protect the public and that the proposed 
legislation was for protection of industry.26 Thus, the AEC bill did 
not provide for indemnity protection in any minimum amount but 
rather left each nuclear power plant owner free to buy from the 
AEC as much indemnity protection as he wanted. Moreover, under 
the original AEC bill, the AEC financial obligation did not arise 
H. GREEN 8: A. ROSENTHAL, GoVERNMENT OF THE ATOM: THE INTEGRATION OF POWERS 
151-52, 153-56, 256-58 (1963). 
23. S. 4146, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). 
21. See 1956 Indemnity Hearings, supra note 8, at 44-46, for the text of the bill. 
25. Id. at 36 (testimony of Harold L. Price, Director, AEC, Division of Civilian 
Applications). 
26. Id. at 56. 
486 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:479 
if the loss occurred by reason of bad faith, willful misconduct, or 
gross negligence on the part of the person indemnified.27 However, as 
a result of highly critical questions and comments by members of 
the Joint Committee,28 it soon became clear that protection of the 
public against uncollectible damage claims was of concern to Con-
gress. Nevertheless, removal of the roadblock to private develop-
ment and use of nuclear power remained the primary objective, 
since, obviously, if nuclear power plants were not built, the public 
would not require assurance of compensation against injury result-
ing from nuclear power plant accidents. 
In June 1956, the Joint Committee reported out the Price-Ander-
son bill,29 but the bill was not considered on the floor of either 
house since its fate had been tied to consideration of the Gore-
Holifield bill, which was reported out by the Joint Committee at 
about the same time.80 The Gore-Holifield bill reflected a lack 
of confidence by the Democratic members of the Joint Committee 
in the ability of private enterprise to develop nuclear power tech-
nology on an appropriate time scale. The bill sought to accelerate 
the development of nuclear power by authorizing and directing the 
AEC to proceed with the immediate development, construction, and 
operation at isolated AEC facilities of several commercial-size nuclear 
power plants to demonstrate their economic feasibility. Whereas the 
Eisenhower Administration strongly supported the Price-Anderson 
bill, it strongly opposed the Gore-Holifield bill.31 The latter bill was 
passed by the Senate but rejected in the House, thereby dooming 
prospects for enactment of the Price-Anderson bill in 1956. 
Pressure for enactment of the Price-Anderson bill continued 
into 1957, and the Joint Committee scheduled new hearings on the 
bill.82 The ultimate pressure was applied when the General Electric 
Company, one 0£ the two primary suppliers of nuclear power plants, 
informed the Joint Committee categorically that it would withdraw 
from the nuclear power business if legislation such as the Price-
Anderson bill were not adopted.83 Once again the Price-Anderson 
27. Id, at 44. 
28. Id. at 55-60. 
29. S. REP. No. 2298, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). 
30. S. REP. No. 2390, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). 
31. See H. GREEN & A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 22, at 78, 151-52. 
32. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental In-
demnity and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong., 1st Sess, (1957) [heyeinafter 1957 Indemnity 
Hearings]. 
33. 1957 Indemnity Hearings, supra note 32, at 148, 156-61 (testimony of Franc~ 
K. McCune, Vice President, General Electric Co.). 
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bill was reported out by the Joint Committee.34 This time it was 
passed by the House by voice vote after debate and by the Senate 
without debate. 
II. THE BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE 1957 PRICE-ANDERSON Acr 
The provisions of the Price-Anderson Act35 are complex, but 
their basic elements can be easily broken down. First of all, they 
require, as a condition of each construction permit and operating 
license issued by the AEC, that the licensee have and maintain 
financial protection to cover public liability claims.36 Although the 
AEC has discretion to determine the amount of such financial pro-
tection, the statute requires that licensees of facilities designed for 
the production of substantial amounts of electricity with a rated 
capacity of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more carry "the maximum 
amount [of financial protection] available from private sources."37 
Since the insurance industry was offering 60 million dollars of 
coverage in 1957, this meant that each licensee of a nuclear power 
plant was required to carry this amount of financial protection. The 
financial protection, however, was not required to be in the form 
of such insurance, but could consist of private contractual indemni-
ties, self-insurance, other proof of financial responsibility, or a com-
bination of these.88 Second, whenever financial protection was re-
quired, it was mandated that the licensee enter into a 500 million 
dollar indemnity agreement with the AEC.39 Although the indemnity 
agreement is between the AEC and the licensee of a nuclear power 
plant (the utility running the plant), it operates to indemnify and 
hold harmless not only the utility, but also any other person who 
might be liable40 as a result of a "nuclear incident," defined to in-
clude 
any occurrence •.. within the United States causing, within or 
outside the United States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, 
34. H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). 
35. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 
(1970)). The Price-Anderson Act was in the form of amendments to the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954. References to provisions of Price•Anderson will, for convenience, be cited 
to the 1954 Act as amended by Price-Anderson. 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 22IO(a) (1970). 
37. 42 u.s.c. § 2210(b) (1970). 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 22I0(b) (1970). 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 22I0(c) (1970). 
40. The indemnity covers "the licensee and other persons indelllnified.11 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2210(c) (1970). "Person indemnified" is defined to mean "the person with whom an 
indemnity agreement is executed and any other person who may be liable for public 
liability." 42 U.S.C. § 2014(t) (1970). 
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or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property, arising 
out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other 
hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or by-product ma-
terial ... . 41 
Since in drafting its insurance policies the insurance industry fol-
lowed the pattern of the indemnity provisions of the Act, the effect 
of the Price-Anderson Act is to extend both the insurance and 
indemnity coverage to any person who may be liable on account 
of a nuclear accident.42 Thus, as the Joint Committee's report on 
the bill makes clear, the indemnification "extends to such persons 
as the subcontractors of the licensee, including those responsible for 
the design and construction of the reactor and the supplying of 
parts."43 Coverage is not limited, however, to persons in contractual 
privity with the licensee, but also applies to strangers. As the Joint 
Committee pointed out, if negligence in maintaining an airplane 
motor should cause an airplane to crash into a reactor causing a 
nuclear incident damaging the public, the airplane company's liabil-
ity would be covered.44 Thus, the insurance and indemnity coverage 
would apply in the case of every nuclear incident and would protect 
each and every person who might have liability regardless of that 
person's relationship with the licensee. 
The purpose of this broad coverage was obviously to ensure a 
mechanism for compensating injured members of the public in the 
event of any nuclear incident regardless of the identity of the causal 
agent. On the other hand, it should be noted that the original Price-
Anderson Act did not provide absolute financial protection to the 
public, since neither indemnification nor insurance coverage applied 
unless persons were found liable under the applicable state law. 
Thus, if a court, in applying applicable state law, did not find 
fault or negligence to be a cause of a nuclear incident or did not 
apply principles of res ipsa loquitur or absolute liability, then the 
public would go uncompensated for damages sustained.45 
41. 42 u.s.c. § 2014(q) (1970). 
42. See STAFF OF SuBCOMM. ON LEGISLATION, JOINT COMM. ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 89th 
CONG,, 1ST SESS., SELECTED MATERIALS ON ATOMIC ENERGY INDEMNITY LEGISLATION 199-243 
(Joint Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter SELECTED MATERIALS]. 
43. H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1957). 
44. Id. The possibility of such a catastrophe is not merely hypothetical. See N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 12, 1972, § I, at I, col. 1: "The heavily armed gunmen who had taken 
over the plane almost 20 hours earlier ••• had threatened to crash the twin-jet craft 
into the Oak Ridge atomic plant in Tennessee if their demands were not met." The 
AEC shut down the plant in response to the threats. Id. 
45. A number of legal scholars have given considerable attention to the question 
whether there would be absolute liability in the event of a nuclear power plant 
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Another important provision of the Act placed a ceiling on 
aggregate liability at an amount equal to the 500 million dollar 
indemnity plus the amount of private financial protection required.46 
Accordingly, since the private protection required at the time Price-
Anderson was enacted was 60 million dollars,47 the Act cut off all 
liability in excess of 560 million dollars, including costs of investi-
gating, settling, and defending claims. Upon a showing that public 
liability would probably exceed this amount, a United States District 
Court with bankruptcy venue over the location of the nuclear in-
cident was required, on application of the AEC or any indemnified 
person, to issue orders designed to apportion the available 560 mil-
lion dollar fund among claimants. 48 The thrust of this provision is 
obvious. The Price-Anderson Act does not fully protect the public 
against loss resulting from a nuclear incident, even when liability has 
been established, if aggregate liability exceeds 560 million dollars. 
Moreover, the Act insulates the nuclear industry from any possible 
liability that is not covered by the insurance and indemnity arrange-
ments.49 
In considering the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act, 
as enacted in 1957, two remarkable facts should be noted. First, the 
transfer of the financial risk of liability from the industry to the 
government represented a complete repudiation of one of the basic 
premises of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Although that Act per-
mitted private possession and use of special nuclear material, owner-
ship of special nuclear material was exclusively in the government 
until 1964. This material, however, was made available by lease 
to licensed utilities for use as fuel in nuclear power plants. One of 
the statutory conditions of such leases was that the licensee indemnify 
catastrophe. See E. STASON, s. EsTEp & w. PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW 635-780 (1959); 
Seavey, Torts and Atoms, 46 CALIF, L REv. 3 (1958); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Legislation of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy on Proposed Extension of AEC 
Indemnity Legislation, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 211-23 (1965) (testimony of Professor 
David F. Cavers) [hereinafter 1965 Indemnity Hearings]. See also W. PROSSER, ToRTS 
§ 78, at 516 (4th ed. 1971). 
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1970). There is a 100 million dollar limit on nuclear 
incidents outside of the United States. 
47. See text accompanying note 16 supra. 
48. This provision was originally part of 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e), but was deleted and 
replaced by other provisions to the same effect by a 1966 amendment. Act of Oct. 13, 
1966, Pub. L No. 89-645, § 3, 80 Stat. 891. See text accompanying note 104 infra. The 
original text of section 2210(e) may be found in SELECTED MATERIALS, supra note 42, at 
93. 
49. This produces a situation comparable to that which would exist if every auto-
mobile owner were required to carry a prescribed amount of public liability insurance 
and could not be held liable for any amount in excess thereof. 
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and hold the United States harmless against liability claims that 
might arise out of the use of the leased special nuclear material.60 
The Price-Anderson Act in effect repealed this provision and, thus, 
made the United States liable to the extent that liability claims 
exceed the limited private insurance protection.151 
Second, the story of the liability roadblock reflects consummate 
"gamesmanship" that does not cast industry, the AEC, or the Joint 
Committee in a favorable light. The fact that potential liability 
would be a substantial deterrent, even if not a "roadblock," to the 
fledgling nuclear power industry was well recognized by all parties 
when the 1954 legislation was being considered. Nevertheless, in the 
entire published152 legislative history of the 1954 Act there is onl} 
one reference tQ the problem.153 The writer was an attorney in the 
Office of the General Counsel of the Atomic Energy Commission in 
1953 and 1954 and was intimately involved in the drafting of the 
legislation. There was an understanding, tacit at least, that the 
liability problem would not be injected into the consideration of 
the legislation, lest enactment be jeopardized by public apprehension. 
There was time enough to raise the problem, it was felt, after the 
bill had become law. 
Indeed, it did not take long for the issue to surface. Almost 
immediately upon enactment of the statute, spokesmen for the 
industry began to discuss "the insurance problem."154 On February 1, 
_1955, less than seven months after the President had signed the bill, 
the General Counsel of the AEC told the Joint Committee: "Dam-
ages from a major accident, if one should occur, might well be 
beyond the capacity of most companies and communities to handle 
50. Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, § 53(e)(8), 68 Stat. 939. 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2073(e)(8), until amended in 1957 by the Price-Anderson Act, 
made it a condition of each license issued for possession and use of special nuclear mate-
rial that "the licensee will hold the United States and the Commission harmless from 
any damages resulting from the use or possession of special nuclear material by the 
licensee." As this provision presently stands following the 1957 amendment, the above 
language is preceded by the phrase "except to the extent that the indemnification and 
limitation of liability provisions of section 2210 [the Price-Anderson Act] apply •••• " 
52. The Joint Committee held many hearings in executive session while the 1954 
legislation was under consideration. These hearings, although recorded in voluminous 
transcripts, have never been made public. Cf. H. GREEN &: A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 22, 
at 125-32. 
53. The problem was briefiy mentioned by a representative of General Electric Co., 
Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy on S. 3233 and H.R. 8862 To 
Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 334 (1954). 
54. A meeting of industry executives to discuss the problem took place in September 
1954, within weeks after the 1954 Act was signed by the President. Atomic Industrial 
Forum, Inc., Forum Metno, Jan. 1955, at 8. 
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and cannot now be fully covered by insurance.''55 And spokesmen 
for industry told the Committee: 
It now seems unlikely that private industry will ever be able to 
underwrite the whole risk of atomic accidents, but it should be 
able to carry a substantial amount of the load. Meanwhile, private 
persons may be unwilling to risk all their possessions and utility 
commissions may be unwilling to allow utilities to risk their as-
sets essential for the regular public service in an endeavor to tame 
a new force which conceivably might destroy them in the process.66 
• • • • 
The potential damage might be much greater in dollar magnitude 
than the net worth of the station operator or the manufacturers of 
the generating equipment and auxiliaries, and hence self-insurance 
is not possible. Insurance companies have thus far not been willing 
or able to write insurance for this extraordinary risk. 67 
• • • • 
The aggregate amount of such claims could easily exceed the re-
sources of any private insurance underwriter, or even groups of 
underwriters. These possibilities suggest that, for some time to come, 
Government must provide the enforcement and inspection agen-
cies and insurance underwriters with a legal umbrella relieving 
them, in part, of the incalculable risks until experience results in 
reduction of the risks to reasonable commercial dimensions.68 
As noted above, by 1956 the problem was openly characterized as 
a "roadblock," and the AEC was speaking of it as a "serious" 
impediment to the development of nuclear power.69 
III. EXPERIENCE UNDER THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT: 1957-1972 
As originally enacted in 1957, Price-Anderson was regarded as 
temporary legislation. Although the requirement for financial pro-
tection as a condition of securing a nuclear power license was in the 
nature of permanent legislation, the indemnity provisions of the 
Act were applicable only to licenses issued between August 30, 1954, 
and August I, 1967.60 When a license was issued within this period 
55. Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, 
and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 59 (1955) (testi-
mony of William Mitchell). 
56. Id. pt. 2, at 258 (testimony of Paul W. McQuillen, Chairman, Legal Comm., 
Atomic Power Developments Associates). 
57. Id. pt. I, at 388 (testimony of Dr. C. G. Suits, Chairman, Subcomm. on Atomic 
Energy, Comm. on Research, NAM). 
58. Id. pt. 3, at 493 (testimony of Earle W. Mills, President, Foster Wheeler Corp.). 
59. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. 
60. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat. 525, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 22IO(c) (1970). 
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and an indemnity agreement was entered into between the AEC and 
the licensee, the indemnity remains in effect for the forty-year 
period of the license. 61 Moreover, since the cut-off of aggregate 
liability at 560 million dollars was applicable to the aggregate 
liability of all "persons indemnified,"62 the limitation on liability 
would remain in effect beyond August 1, 1967, for the full term of 
such licenses. The AEC was, however, precluded from entering into 
indemnity agreements whenever a license was issued after August 1, 
1967, and, therefore, the cut-off of liability would not be applicable 
to nuclear incidents in such subsequently licensed facilities. The 
termination of authority to enter into indemnity agreements was 
based on the hope that by that time "there will be enough experi-
ence gained so that the problems of reactor safety will be solved 
and the insurance people will have had experience on which to base 
a sound program of their own."63 
Experience during the first eight years of the Price-Anderson 
Act was eminently satisfactory. The deterrent to private investment 
in nuclear power had been removed, as evidenced by the existence 
of over one million electrical kilowatts of nuclear power generating 
capacity by 1965. Moreover, there had been no nuclear power plant 
accidents causing injury to the public.64 
In 1965, the AEC and the Joint Committee undertook considera-
tion of a possible extension of the Act, and hearings were held by 
the Committee in June of that year. In contemplation of these 
hearings, it was announced that the AEC had commissioned the 
Brookhaven National Laboratory to conduct a new study to update 
its 1957 Report on the theoretical possibilities and consequences of 
a major nuclear power plant accident. The results of this study have 
never been made public, presumably to avoid unduly alarming the 
public.65 The Chairman of the AEC did, however, inform the Joint 
Committee by letter dated June 18, 1965: 
61. Although the statute is not explicit on this point, the Joint Committee's report 
stated: "The provisions of this bill provide governmental indemnifications to those 
licensees who obtain their licenses within the next IO years. The indemnification agree-
ment is to run for the life of the license." H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 
(1957). 
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1970). 
63. H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1957). 
64. H.R. REP. No. 883, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965). 
65. That such a study was launched is indisputable. On December 3, 1964, AEC 
Commissioner Palfrey, speaking at the annual meeting of the Atomic Industrial Forum, 
stated: 
My assignment today was to review with you the updating of the Brookhaven report 
on the theoretical consequences of major nuclear accidents .••• Well, the Brook-
haven study is not ready yet. .•• 
I think I should beg off on the Brookhaven study because my guesses on what it 
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Reactors today are much larger than those in prospect in 1957, 
their fuel cycles are longer and their fission product inventories are 
larger. Therefore, assuming the same kind of hypothetical acci-
dents as those in the 1957 study, the theoretically calculated damages 
would not be less and under some circumstances would be substan-
tially more than the consequences reported in the earlier study.66 
On August 20, the Joint Committee reported a bill67 to extend the 
authority of the AEC to enter into indemnity agreements for an 
additional ten-year period to August I, 1977. It was the Committee's 
view that the "experience in this field is not yet sufficiently great 
nor the technology sufficiently developed, that it is possible to deny 
the theoretical possibility" of a catastrophic accident.68 Moreover, 
based on the testimony of every witness representing the nuclear 
industry, the Committee concluded that the then potential threat 
of uninsurable liability was probably as great a deterrent to "neces-
sary industrial participation" in nuclear power as it had been in 
1957.69 
The bill as reported by the Joint Committee, and ultimately 
enacted,70 also reflected the willingness of the insurance industry to 
increase the amount of liability insurance available. At the urging 
of the Joint Committee, the insurance industry agreed that it would, 
effective January I, 1966, provide liability coverage in the amount 
of 74 million dollars, approximately a twenty-five per cent increase.71 
The Joint Committee concluded that aggregate coverage under the 
will say or should say could be irresponsible chatter on a ticklish subject that needs 
accurate reporting. All I will say is what you probably know, that seven years after 
the first study, one is considering theoretically conceivable accidents in a reactor 
which is considerably larger than in 1957, located somewhat closer to population 
centers, with the confidence of increased operating experience and constantly im-
proving designs and engineered safeguards. 
AEC Press Release No. S-30-64, Dec. 3, 1964. 
66. 1965 Indemnity Hearings, supra note 45, at 347-48. The letter reported that the 
"probability of catastrophe is exceedingly low, even lower than our estimate of the 
remote probability of such an event in 1957 •••• We cannot say, however, that the like-
lihood is non-existent." Id. at 348. 
67. H.R. REP. No. 883, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The authors of the report took 
pains to make it clear that the primary purpose of the Price-Anderson Act was "provid-
ing assurance that funds will be made available to satisfy public liability claims arising 
from a catastrophic nuclear incident." Id. at 5. 
68. Id. at 6. Mirroring the hope reflected in its 1957 report on the original indemnity 
legislation that by 1967 experience would have obviated the necessity for such a statute 
(see text accompanying note 63 supra), the 1965 report suggested that by 1977 "a signifi-
cant amount of data will have been accumulated, which should enable the industry and 
Congress to assess much more accurately the likelihood of a major nuclear incident and 
the insurance requirements of the nuclear industry." Id. at IO. 
69. Id. at 9. 
70. Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-210, 79 Stat. 855 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2210(c)-(e), (k)-(l) (1970)). 
71. H.R. REP. No. 883, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1965). 
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insurance and indemnity arrangements should remain at 560 million 
dollars. Accordingly, the Act was amended to limit the amount of 
the government indemnity to 500 million dollars less the amount 
by which privately available financial protection exceeds 60 million 
dollars.72 The effect of this was to reduce the government's indemnity 
exposure from 500 million dollars to 486 million dollars and to 
retain the liability cut-off at 560 million dollars. 
During the course of its consideration of the 1965 legislation, the 
Joint Committee became concerned about the possible need to im-
prove the Price-Anderson Act to enhance the financial protection of 
the public against the possibility of a serious nuclear power plant 
accident. By the terms of the Act, the indemnity was available only 
when the claimant established that legal liability existed, and the 
Act left undisturbed the basic principle of American law that 
liability is to be determined under applicable state law. Unless, 
under the circumstances of a particular nuclear incident, applicable 
state law provided for imposition of liability without fault under 
some variant of the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher,73 a claimant 
could recover under the indemnity only if negligence could be estab-
lished. Since only a minority of American states have accepted the 
principle of strict liability, it appeared likely that in many cases 
financial protection of the public would be available only if fault 
could be established. Moreover, the requirement that fault be proved 
might present an insurmountable obstacle to recovery, since much 
of the relevant evidence would likely be destroyed or rendered 
unavailable for many years in the event of a serious nuclear accident.74 
Even if fault could be established or applicable state law pro-
vided for liability without fault, other problems existed that might 
impair financial protection of the public. These problems arise from 
the effect of radiation on human beings. When an individual is 
exposed to a large amount of radiation, somatic injury may be 
immediate and apparent. At lower levels of exposure, however, the 
radiation may produce a latent injury that does not become manifest 
until sometime in the future, perhaps years later.715 Thus, recovery 
may be precluded by operation of the applicable state statute of 
limitations. And, quite apart from the problem of limitations, since 
radiation injuries are nonspecific, a plaintiff faces immense difficulties 
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1970) provides, following this amendment, that the basic 
500 million dollar indemnity "shall be reduced by the amount that the financial pro• 
tection required shall exceed $60,000,000." 
73. L.R. 3 HL. 330 (1868). 
74. H.R. REP. No. 2043, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966). 
75. Id. at 20-21. 
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in his effort to establish a causal connection between his exposure 
to radiation resulting from the nuclear incident and an illness that 
becomes apparent at a later date.76 Finally, exposure to radiation 
produces undesirable genetic mutations that become manifest only 
in later generations, 77 and may also result in a general life-shortening 
effect.78 Neither genetic injury nor life-shortening is presently ade-
quately cognizable in American courts as giving rise to liability.79 
Thus, although the original Price-Anderson Act provided more 
financial protection for the public than would have otherwise 
existed (assuming, of course, that private investment would have 
gone forward even without the 1957 legislation), it clearly did not 
provide a mechanism that would assure that all persons injured in a 
nuclear incident would receive monetary compensation. This situa-
tion led to recommendations that Congress enact legislation to estab-
lish a federal law of strict liability with respect to nuclear incidents 
so as to assure, regardless of applicable state law, that the benefits 
of the Price-Anderson Act would be available to all persons equally 
without the need to establish fault. 80 
Thus, when it reported out the 1965 bill extending the indem-
nity provisions of the Act until 1977, the Joint Committee identified 
three areas warranting further review: first, the adequacy of state 
tort law and whether the Price-Anderson Act should be amended 
to establish a federal basis of liability for nuclear incidents and 
to provide a means for consolidation of suits resulting therefrom; 
second, the adequacy of state statutes of limitations, considering the 
fact that radiation injuries are frequently latent for many years; and 
third, the difficulty of establishing causal relationships in radiation 
injury cases.81 The Committee was troubled by the possibility that 
persons injured as a result of a nuclear incident would be "sub-
jected to a series of substantive and procedural hurdles which would 
prevent the speedy satisfaction of a legitimate claim"82 and expressed 
determination that "the promise to the public, contained in the 
Price-Anderson Act, will not prove to be an illusory one."83 Accord-
76. E. STASON, s. EsTEP & w. PIERCE, supra note 45, at 79. 
77. Id. at 28-30. The genetic effects of radiation have generally been ignored by the 
AEC and the Joint Committee in their pronouncements on nuclear power plant hazards. 
78. Id. at 35. 
79. Id. at 221-27. 
80. See, e.g., 1965 Indemnity Hearings, supra note 45, at 211-23 (testimony of Pro-
fessor David F. Cavers). 
81. H.R. REP. No. 883, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1965). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
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ingly, it was stated that hearings on this subject would be held at an 
early date.84 
The promised hearings were held in July 1966, and a bill was 
reported85 on September 14, 1966, and enacted in due course, to 
establish, in effect, absolute liability for nuclear power catastrophes.86 
It accomplishes this, however, in a rather indirect manner. The 
possibility of federal legislation directly and explicitly establishing 
a rule of absolute liability in the event of a serious nuclear power 
plant accident was considered and rejected by the Joint Committee 
for four reasons. First, a federal rule of absolute liability could 
inhibit the development and use of nuclear power by singling out 
the nuclear industry as one for which extraordinary rules of liability 
are necessary, thereby "stimulating public apprehension of the po-
tential dangers of atomic activities" and subjecting the industry to 
a series of harassing and unfounded claims. 87 Second, such a measure 
would not be consistent with the principle of the Price-Anderson 
Act that there be interference with state law only to the minimum 
extent necessary.88 Third, it would be difficult to obtain a consensus 
on any such bill since "the principles of strict liability are not 
entirely well defined, and many aspects of this problem are subject 
to dispute among courts and legal scholars."89 Moreover, creation 
of a federal tort would require consideration of such matters as 
proof of damages, causation, and the possible continued validity 
of portions of state law.11° Finally and "most important of all, per-
haps," said the Committee, was the fact that the nuclear industry 
strongly preferred the Joint Committee's alternative approach.91 
Therefore, the legislation included a "unique system of waivers," 
thereby avoiding the "differences of opinion" surrounding an 
absolute liability statute and providing a "strong indication of con-
tinuing and strengthening the partnership between Government 
and private industry ... :•02 
The net effect of the ingenious provision for waiver of certain 
defenses is absolute liability. The AEC is authorized to require 
inclusion of provisions in both existing and future indemnity agree-
84. Id. 
85. H.R. REP. No. 2043, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n) (1970). 
87. H.R. REP. No. 2043, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966). 
88. Id. at 9. 
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ments with licensees and in insurance policies furnished as proof 
of financial responsibility whereby persons indemnified and their 
insurers waive certain rights. First, they waive "any issue or de-
fense as to the conduct"03 of the claimant. This is intended to 
eliminate any question or defense as to contributory negligence or 
assumption of risk.94 Second, persons indemnified and their insurers 
waive "any issue or defense" as to the "fault of the persons indemni-
fied .... "05 This, of course, establishes absolute liability. Third, the 
enactment provides for a waiver of "any issue or defense based on any 
statute of limitations if suit is instituted within three years from the 
date on which the claimant first knew, or reasonably could have 
known, of his injury and the cause thereof, but in no event more 
than ten years after the date of the nuclear incident."96 The statute 
further provides that such waivers are to be judicially enforceable 
by the claimant.97 
The waivers do not, however, apply in all cases of nuclear in-
cidents, but only to a nuclear incident that is an "extraordinary 
nuclear occurrence."98 This term is defined to mean an event causing 
the dispersal of nuclear material that the AEC determines has 
resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons or 
property offsite.99 Although the AEC is required to establish written 
criteria denoting the basis upon which such a determination will 
be made,100 that statute provides that such a determination "shall 
be final and conclusive, and no other official or any court shall have 
power or jurisdiction" to review it.101 It is the AEC's determination, 
after the event, that there has been an extraordinary nuclear occur-
rence that triggers the applicability of the waiver of defenses. Thus, 
in the case of a "nonextraordinary" nuclear incident, defendants 
would have all defenses available to them, and liability would be 
determined under traditional tort law. 
The 1966 amendments also included other additions to the 
Act. Provision was made for "emergency assistance payments" to 
injured persons, without requirement of a release or compromise 
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(l) (1970). 
94. H.R. REP. No. 2043, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1966). 
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(l) (1970). 
96. 42 U.S.C. § 22IO(n)(l) (1970). 
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(l) (1970). 
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(l) (1970). 
99. 42 u.s.c. § 2014G) (1970). 
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1970). The Commission's criteria are set forth at IO C.F.R. 
§§ 140.81-.85 (1972). 
IOI. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1970). 
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of claims, pending final resolution.102 In addition, in the case of 
suits arising out of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, original 
jurisdiction is vested in the United States District Court in the 
district in which the occurrence takes place, and any action brought 
in any other federal or state court may be transferred to such dis-
trict court on "motion of the defendant or the Commission."103 
Finally, when the court determines that public liability may exceed 
the limit of aggregate permissible liability with respect to any nuclear 
incident, procedures are spelled out for the apportionment and 
payment of claims with due regard to possible latent injury claims 
that may not be discovered until a later time.104 
Although the 1966 amendments clearly enhance the financial 
protection of the public against reactor catastrophe, they are not 
panaceas. The difficult problem of proving a causal link between a 
nuclear incident and delayed radiation injury remains, as does the 
problem of financial compensation for genetic injury and life-
shortening. 105 
Finally, to round out the history of the Price-Anderson Act 
since 1957, it should be noted that the insurance industry increased 
the amount of liability insurance available to 82 million dollars in 
1968 and to 95 million dollars in 1972.106 Meanwhile, the nuclear 
power industry's excellent record of safety has continued. Although 
there have been malfunctions and accidents in nuclear power plants, 
there have been no accidents that have resulted in damage to persons 
or property offsite. 
IV. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As noted above, there has been, since the earliest days of con-
sideration of the nuclear energy liability question, a dual justifica-
tion £or the Price-Anderson Act: first, establishment of a mechanism 
for compensating members of the public who may sustain losses in 
the event of a serious nuclear accident; and, second, avoiding the 
possibility that a serious accident might result in bankrupting liabil-
ity to utilities and industrial concerns because of the potentiality 
of enormous, uninsurable liability. 
With respect to the first of these justifications, it is difficult to 
102. 42 U .S.C. § 2210(m) (1970). 
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (1970). 
104. 42 u.s.c. § 2210(0) (1970). 
105. See Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to 
Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259 (1960). 
106. 10 C.F.R. § 140.ll(a)(4) (1972), as amended, 37 Fed. Reg. M23 (1972). 
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argue against a public policy that provides assurance that members 
of the public who are injured because of a major disaster should 
receive financial assistance from the federal government. Indeed, 
it is well known that the federal government has usually responded 
with financial assistance after catastrophic floods, earthquakes, and 
hurricanes. Even when the catastrophe results from human activity 
rather than natural causes, as in the case of the Texas City disaster 
of 1947, it is likely that Congress will respond with financial as-
sistance for victims who otherwise would be without sources of 
private relief.107 Such governmental measures have, however, gener-
ally provided for less than total compensation for damage sustained, 
and the relief has usually been available only after considerable 
delay.108 A government commitment to a scheme of "social insur-
ance" that will provide prompt, certain, and adequate financial 
compensation for losses sustained as a result of catastrophic events 
does, therefore, make considerable sense. 
It should be noted, however, that Congress has clearly shown a 
preference to deal with such problems on an ad hoc, after-the-fact 
basis, rather than to enact a formal, automatic statutory scheme for 
compensation of disaster victims. In recent years, numerous pro-
posals for general programs to compensate victims of natural and 
man-caused catastrophes have been before the Congress and have 
not been enacted or even seriously considered. If it is public policy 
to ensure compensation of the public for losses sustained as a result 
of catastrophic occurrences, it is obviously illogical to apply this 
policy only in the case of nuclear technology and to ignore both 
natural catastrophes capable of producing injury of equally astro-
nomical dimensions and man-caused disasters such as those that may 
result from, for example, various extra-hazardous military and space 
activities. The fact that atomic energy has been singled out for this 
unique form of government beneficence must, therefore, be at-
tributable to something more than a general policy of compensating 
the public for losses sustained in catastrophes for which adequate 
insurance protection is not available. 
This suggests that it is the second justification-namely, protec-
tion of the nuclear industry against bankrupting public liability-
that is the primary consideration underlying the Price-Anderson 
107. For a brief description of the Texas City disaster and its aftermath, see A. 
ROSENTHAL, H. KORN & S. LUBMAN, CATASTROPIDC ACClDENTS IN GOVERNMENT PROGltAMS 
3-4 (1963) (a study by the Columbia University Drafting Research Fund). See also 
Kunreuther, The Case for Comprehensive Disaster Insurance, II J. LAw & EcoN. 133 
(1968). 
108. See A. ROSENTHAL, H. KORN & s. LUBMAN, supra note 107, at 2-4. 
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Act. This leaves unanswered, however, the question why only the 
nuclear industry has been given such protection. In part, this is 
attributable to the fact that insurance coverage is available in most 
other extra-hazardous technological areas since the insurance com-
panies have both the experience and financial capacity to provide 
coverage deemed adequate by industry, or to the fact that the in-
dustry itself has the financial resources to provide self-insurance. 
This is not universally true, however, since numerous industrial 
concerns are subject to enormous uninsurable liability, such as 
government contractors engaged in such extra-hazardous activities as 
space vehicle launchings, transportation of rocket fuels, weather con-
trol, and production of missiles and nuclear bombs and warheads. 
A 1963 study by the Columbia University Legislative Drafting Re-
search Fund concluded that 
[t]he role of the contractors in most of these programs is so inti-
mately associated with and subordinate to that of the government 
that the losses ought to be regarded as part of the cost of the gov-
ernment program. It would be particularly damaging to the govern-
ment itself to allow the destruction of any substantial segment of 
the industrial capacity upon which our defense and other basic 
national programs depend.1°9 
Although present law authorizes indemnification of some such con-
tractors engaged in ultrahazardous activities, the study regards such 
statutes as inadequate and therefore contractors "are now exposed to 
the danger of devastating liabilities with no sure means of guarding 
against them .... "110 Broader indemnification legislation applicable 
to such activities has been submitted to Congress on numerous oc-
casions but has not been enacted. 
Curiously, however, as the Columbia study points out, industrial 
companies have been willing to engage in ultrahazardous govern-
ment contract work without government indemnity protection, per-
haps because they cannot maintain their competitive positions, or 
in some cases even survive, without government business.111 Indeed, 
many of the very industrial concerns that insisted upon enactment 
of Price-Anderson as a precondition to remaining in the atomic 
energy business have exhibited little reluctance to accept ultra-
hazardous government work without comparable protection. As a 
matter of fact, there is little doubt that nuclear equipment manu-
facturers, who expressed reluctance to supply the equipment for pri-
109. Id. at 12. 
110. Id. at 11-12. 
111. Id. at 74. 
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vate nuclear power projects without the Price-Anderson Act protec-
tion, would have been eager to supply the same equipment to the 
AEC under a contract with that agency. This reflects the fact that 
AEC projects would have been located at more remote sites with 
less potential for injury to the public. It may also reflect greater 
confidence in safe operation by the AEC than by private utility 
companies. 
Why, then, was privately sponsored nuclear power technology 
singled out for unique statutory treatment in this respect? The 
reasons are not difficult to identify. First and foremost, there was a 
national policy commitment to bring about the rapid development, 
introduction, and use of nuclear power technology and to rely upon 
private enterprise to accomplish this objective. This commitment 
gave the nuclear power industry considerable bargaining leverage, 
much more leverage than exists with respect to government contract-
ing. The industry was in a position to insist upon government finan-
cial protection against massive uninsurable liability. Second, the 
demand for such financial protection was addressed to the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, a uniquely aggressive and expansion-
minded congressional committee eager to spur the development of 
nuclear technology. The Joint Committee was, moreover, capable 
of pushing the Price-Anderson legislation through Congress without 
friction, since the Congress has almost always rubber-stamped legisla-
tion proposed by the Joint Committee.112 It is quite likely that the 
atomic energy indemnity legislation would never have seen the light 
of day if it had been submitted to any other congressional committee, 
such as Armed Services, Judiciary, or Banking and Currency. 
The Price-Anderson Act must, therefore, be viewed as a measure 
adopted for the primary purpose of freeing the nuclear industry 
from the spectre of massive potential liability, thereby eliminating 
an impediment to the industry's development and introduction of 
nuclear power. Viewed in another way, it was legislation intended to 
encourage the development and use of nuclear power by private 
industry. It was in a very real sense the extension of a government 
subsidy to the nuclear industry.113 The characterization of the Price-
Anderson protection as a subsidy has been vigorously contested by 
the AEC and the Joint Committee. It has been argued that no sub-
sidy is involved because no payments under the Act have ever been 
112. See H. GREEN & A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 22, at 146-49. 
11!1. This point was cogently made by Congressman Holifield in a statement ap-
pended to the Joint Committee report on the Price-Anderson bill. H.R. REP. No. 435, 
85th Cong., 1st Sess. !15-47 (1957). 
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made by the government and because industry pays fees for the 
Price-Anderson indemnity protection.114 It is apparent, however> 
that there is a subsidy in reality, although it may be regarded as an 
inverse subsidy in the sense that the Act relieves industry of some 
of the costs of providing for contingent liability rather than provid-
ing direct revenues as is the case with the typical subsidy program. 
A business enterprise will invest money in a project only if it 
estimates that the investment will yield a profit, that revenues will 
exceed costs. In estimating costs, consideration must be given to the 
costs of potential liability in the event of an occurrence giving rise 
to public liability. The magnitude of these potential costs will be 
determined by considering the aggregate liability that might result, 
discounted by the probability of the occurrence. The availability of 
liability insurance enables the enterprise to shift the risk of liability 
to insurance companies and to translate the uncertain costs of po-
tential liability into ascertainable sums paid periodically as insurance 
premiums. The premiums charged for insurance coverage represent 
the judgment of the insurance companies, our society's professionals 
in risk assessment, as to the magnitude of potential liability and the 
probability of the occurrence. If the costs of insurance are too high 
relative to the anticipated revenues, thereby presenting a discourag-
ing picture of potential profit, investment will be deterred. If ade-
quate insurance coverage is not available, investment will likewise 
be deterred when the enterprise's estimate of uninsurable costs of 
liability is too high relative to anticipated revenues. Thus, the 
liability mechanism operates as a self-regulatory device to discourage 
extra-hazardous business activity.115 
114. The Joint Committee's report on the 1965 extension bill, which was pre-
sented to the House of Representatives by Congressman Holifield, states: 
It is true that the Government's indemnity is valuable and is provided at a charge 
which is presumably much lower than the charge which would be assessed for 
"commercial" insurance if such insurance were available. However, the fundamental 
reason why the indemnity is necessary is that there is not yet enough experience on 
which to base a firm judgment on the likelihood of the indemnity ever being uti• 
lized. Expert opinion holds this indemnity almost certainly will never be utilized. 
If this opinion eventually is proven correct, then there surely is no Government 
subsidy involved here, and in fact power reactor operators have been paying for 
protection above that which is necessary. 
H,R. REP. No. 883, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965). 
115. The relationship between the liability mechanism and insurance protection, 
on the one hand, and the rate of technological advance, on the other, has apparently 
not been the subject of serious study by economists. See G. FIELDS, THE INFLUENCE OF 
INSURANCE ON TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT (1969) (George Washington University Pro-
gram of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, Staff Discussion Paper 405). The lack 
of interest in this subject probably reflects the apparent uniqueness of nuclear power 
technology (within the private enterprise sector), which has produced an overnight 
quantum. jump in potential liability in an area in which relatively little risk experience 
is available. 
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In the case of nuclear power, industry professed confidence that 
the probability of a serious accident that might give rise to massive 
liability was extremely low. Nevertheless, the potential uninsurable 
liability if such an accident occurred was so high that the industry 
was unwilling to accept the costs even after discounting such potential 
liability by the extremely low probability of the occurrence. The 
effect of the Price-Anderson Act was, therefore, to overcome the 
deterrent effect of the liability mechanism and to permit and en-
courage the industry to invest in this ultrahazardous technology. 
Costs of potential liability are not, however, totally eliminated from 
the industry's calculation. A utility operating a nuclear power plant 
is required to carry the maximum amount of insurance available, at 
the present time 95 million dollars, and to pay premiums for this 
coverage. Although the insurance companies still do not have suffi-
cient experience with nuclear technology from which premiums can 
be accurately related to actual risks, it may be assumed that the 
premiums are based on their assessment of the risk.116 In addition, 
the utility is required to pay a fee to the AEC for its indemnity 
protection.lli This fee bears no relationship to assessment of risk. 
Thus, a utility contemplating construction and operation of a 
nuclear power plant may make its profit projections by taking into 
account as costs of potential public liability the ascertainable insur-
ance premiums and indemnity fee. Moreover, because of Price-
Anderson's cut-off of liability at 560 million dollars, it is free of 
concern about possible liability in excess of the amount covered by 
insurance and indemnity-even though the possibility exists of 
liability substantially in excess of 560 million dollars. It should also 
be noted that Price-Anderson also drastically reduces the deterrent 
effect of liability as it affects decisions regarding the siting of plants 
(particularly as they relate to locating plants closer to population 
centers), cost-cutting measures, and investment in plants with pro-
gressively larger power capacity (as capacity increases, more fission 
products are stored, and the amount of damage that may result from 
an accident also increases). 
The net effect of Price-Anderson is to encourage the industry to 
make decisions on technological and economic bases without reckon-
lln. In a recent nuclear power licensing proceeding before the AEC, the parties 
entered into a stipulation which shows that Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 
will pay an annual premium of 250,000 dollars for its 95 million dollar public liability 
imurance and an annual fee of 73,500 dollars for its 465 million dollar AEC indemnity 
contract. It pays nothing, of course, for the added protection afforded by the cut-off 
of aggregate liability at 560 million dollars. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., AEC Dkt. 
No. 50-809, Jt. Ex. I. 
117. 42 u.s.c. § 2210(£) (1970). 
504 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:479 
ing with the full social costs that may result in the event of an 
accident. In other words, in an era in which environmental concern 
is leading to increased emphasis on internalization of social costs, 
the effect of Price-Anderson is to externalize these costs.118 It is not 
suggested that Price-Anderson provides industry with a license for 
1·eckless business decisions in disregard of the public safety. There 
remain other important economic and noneconomic factors that 
provide powerful incentives for industry to make nuclear power 
plants as safe as possible. Moreover, to the extent that reduction of 
the deterrent effect of liability may represent a compromise of 
safety, this is counter-balanced by the unusually stringent regulatory 
program established under the Atomic Energy Act. Yet, AEC regula-
tion is neither a panacea nor a completely effective prophylactic. 
Human error, miscalculation, and inaccurate predictions as to how 
systems will function can be just as prevalent among regulators as 
among those who are regulated.119 In addition, the very existence 
of nuclear power plants (AEC regulation is premised on the as-
sumption that nuclear power plants should exist) creates the risk 
of a catastrophic occurrence through totally unforeseeable circum-
stances such as the crash of an airplane into the power plant, a 
combination of human and technological failures, or an act of God. 
Perhaps the most substantial public policy issue raised by Price-
Anderson relates to the degree of risk that society will be compelled 
to accept in the name of technological progress. As discussed above, 
at the time the Price-Anderson Act was adopted, maximum private 
liability insurance coverage on the order of magnitude of 15 million 
dollars appeared to be adequate for most American industries.120 
With enactment of Price-Anderson, the maximum coverage avail-
118. Cf. Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. 
L. REv. 587 (1969). Professor Katz regards the trend toward enterprise liability and 
liability for distinctive risk as desirable in promoting "therapeutic deterrence" which 
will stimulate enterprise to consider positive and constructive alternatives to hazardous 
technologies. Id. at 607. He regards the Price-Anderson Act as a commendable exemplar 
that internalizes social costs to the extent that the Act requires licensees to carry in-
surance protection. Although he seems to recognize that "at least a fraction of the 
vast social rosts of a nuclear incident" is internalized by Price-Anderson, he does not 
discern that this fraction is so small that the element of therapeutic deterrence is al-
most wholly eliminated, a fact that is obvious since the net effect of Price-Anderson is 
to encourage (if not subsidize) nuclear power rather than to deter it. See id. at 653-54. 
119. ''With all the inherent safeguards that can be put into a reactor, there is still 
no foolproof system. Any system can be defeated by a great enough fool." INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY, SAFETY AsPEC'IS OF NUCLEAR REACTORS 
136 (C. McCullough ed. 1957). Dr. McCullough was for many years Chairman of the 
AEC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and was a leading authority on 
nuclear safety. The substance of the sentences quoted above is attributed by Dr. Mc• 
Cullough to Dr. Edward Teller. Id. at 166 n.l. 
120. See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra. 
January 1973] Nuclear Power 505 
able was increased four-fold, and the nuclear industry was still un-
willing to proceed with nuclear power without an indemnity 
commitment and liability cut-off at a figure at least thirty to forty 
times the amount of the maximum liability insurance previously 
available. It is fair to infer from this that, with the advent of nuclear 
power, our society is bearing the risk that a single occurrence in a 
nuclear power plant could result in destruction thirty to forty times, 
and perhaps even more, than the maximum previously deemed sig-
nificant before the advent of nuclear power. If, moreover, one takes 
into account the possible level of damages estimated in the Brook-
haven Report,121 the relevant factor increases another ten-fold. This 
raises the question whether there is any level of potential catastrophe 
that may result from use of a technology which our society will 
regard as unacceptably high despite the fact that the technology will 
yield substantial benefits. 
One virtue of the traditional liability and insurance mechanisms 
is that they promote a relatively slow, step-by-step advance in 
hazardous technologies and discourage rapid technological advance 
involving a quantum jump in risk: The prudent businessman will 
not introduce a technological advance involving substantial potential 
public liability unless adequate insurance can be obtained at ac-
ceptable premium rates; and such insurance becomes available only 
on a step-by-step basis as the insurance companies' experience and 
confidence at each level enable them to offer insurance for the next 
step.122 Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Chairman of the AEC, has likened 
the evolution of nuclear power technology since 1954 to compressing 
the entire history of commercial aviation from Kitty Hawk to the 
Boeing 747 into less than twenty years.123 Such an evolution of the 
aircraft industry could not have come about in so short a time with-
out substantial risk to the public safety, primarily because such 
rapid growth can come about only through leapfrogging experience. 
While such a leapfrogging process in the nuclear power industry 
has occurred under conditions of stringent AEC regulation, it should 
be noted that the quality and adequacy of regulation itself are 
largely a function of experience. It is suggested, therefore, that there 
may be considerable merit in the normal situation in which the 
availability of insurance controls, in the first instance, the rate of 
advance of hazardous technologies. Thus, the initial decision to 
121. See text accompanying note 13 supra. 
122. Again, it is noted that there is little authority for this analysis other than what 
the author believes to be sound economic logic. See note II5 supra. 
123. Address of James R. Schlesinger, Oct. 20, 1971, AEC Press Release, S-21-71. 
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proceed with the technology is made by private interests as a result 
of their assessment of prospective revenues and costs (including costs 
of liability and/or insurance against liability). Unless this assess-
ment process flashes a green light for the technology to be developed 
and used, there will be no such technological activities to be regulated 
by the government. In this normal mode government regulation is 
a supplement to, and not a substitute for, the forces of the market-
place in regulating~usually by controlling and restricting-the tech-
nology; and government regulation does not "attach" until after 
the technology passes the test of the market. In short, therefore, the 
availability of insurance coverage and the willingness of insurance 
companies to provide it at feasible rates are probably the best objec-
tive index to that level of risk which our society regards as acceptable. 
On the other hand, it must be recognized that in many areas the 
government cannot rely, and has not relied, on the market to pro-
vide technological advance. For example, in areas where technologi-
cal advance is vital for purposes of national defense (such as military 
technology) or national prestige (such as space technology), the 
government cannot rely on market forces to produce an adequate 
rate of technological advance and introduction, but must directly 
support and procure the development and introduction of these 
technologies. In recent years, and especially since World War II, 
government support of technological development has broadened to 
include many technologies of an essentially commercial character 
(for example, nuclear power, medicine, saline water conversion, and 
the supersonic transport). The government's benevolent policy to-
ward nuclear power, as reflected in the Price-Anderson Act, is there-
fore based on the legislative judgment that this technology is of 
such vital importance to the public interest that its development 
and use must be forced at a more rapid rate than the market will 
permit. Price-Anderson's elimination or reduction of the deterrent 
effect of liability contributes directly to this objective. Stating this 
another way, Price-Anderson encourages and permits industry to 
employ an extremely hazardous technology, fraught with the po-
tential for catastrophe. Because the technology is deemed vital to 
the public interest, the public is forced to accept the hazard in the 
same manner as it is forced to pay taxes to further this public inter-
est. Significantly, however, the public is compelled to bear this risk, 
however remote, which industry itself is not prepared to bear, and is 
offered only the solace that, if a catastrophic accident in fact occurs, 
a fund exists to compensate-at least to a substantial extent-the 
pecuniary losses sustained. 
January 1973] Nuclear Power 507 
There was, and perhaps still is, an alternative means to meet the 
public interest requirement for nuclear power that would more 
clearly distinguish between the public interest and the element of 
Price-Anderson support for industry's development and use of nuclear 
power technology for private profit. The original Atomic Energy 
Act of 1946 contemplated that nuclear power would be developed 
by the AEC, under a government monopoly, until the time when 
the technology had been brought to the point of "practical value," 
at which time the door would be opened to private enterprise. The 
concept of "practical value" connotes acceptability in the marketplace 
taking into account all anticipated revenues and costs. Perhaps it 
would have made sense to have continued this policy until the AEC 
itself had developed the technology to the point at which the risk 
of public liability became one that private enterprise-utilities, 
equipment manufacturers, investors, and insurance carriers-would 
find acceptable. Had this policy been continued, the AEC would 
presumably have constructed and operated demonstration nuclear 
power plants only at its relatively isolated sites such as Oak Ridge, 
Hanford, and Los Alamos. A major accident at such an isolated site 
might have caused great damage to personnel and property of the 
AEC and its contractors, but the general public would have been 
exposed to little risk. When safety had been demonstrated through 
adequate experience, private enterprise would, it is hoped, have been 
willing to adopt the proven technology for use in sites closer to 
population centers. 
Such an alternative approach was in fact advocated in the 1950's 
by Congressman Holifield, a senior member of the Joint Com.mittee 
on Atomic Energy, who strenuously opposed enactment of the 1954 
Act on the theory that private enterprise was not prepared to invest 
in nuclear power without substantial government subsidies.124 He 
similarly opposed enactment of the Price-Anderson Act as a subsidy 
that would place upon the federal government "an enormous po• 
tential liability that could reach several hundred billion dollars."125 
He argued: 
In my view this legislation is unnecessary and unwise. If the risks 
are negligible, as the proponents of the bill contend, there is no 
reason why the Government should assume potential liabilities of 
the magnitude indicated above. If the risks are real and substan-
tial, then reactor development programs should continue to be 
developed under direct Government supervision and control at 
124. See H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 105-38 (1954). 
125. H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-40 (1957). 
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isolated locations, with the continued promise of safety exhibited 
in the record of Government performance. 
Until we can prove by a history of experience in the operation of 
the new and unproven power reactors (which are now planned) that 
they are safe mechanisms, we should insist they be located safe dis-
tances from populated centers. Congress cannot evade its re-
sponsibility for protecting human lives by authorizing huge dollar 
payments.126 
The logic of this argument is even more compelling in 1972 with the 
recognition that there are now twenty-eight operable nuclear power 
plants in operation in the United States, with an additional 112 
under construction or on order and scheduled for completion by 
1980,127 each one of which has the potential for a catastrophic 
accident. 
It is too late today to turn back the clock and eliminate the 
existing nuclear power plants or to declare a blanket moratorium on 
the construction of new plants. Perhaps, however, a moratorium 
could be imposed on the construction and operation of additional 
plants involving concepts not fully tested, except by the AEC at 
isolated locations. Such a course of action would provide additional 
nuclear power with minimum risk. 
The authority of the AEC to indemnify licensees of new nuclear 
power plants will expire in 1977, and it is likely that consideration 
of another extension will commence in 1974. There is no reason 
to believe that industry will not press for another ten-year extension 
of the indemnity authority in its present form. Any such extension 
will be vigorously contested by the environmental groups that have 
in recent years mounted an ever-increasing attack on nuclear power. 
These groups have seized upon the existence of the Price-Anderson 
Act as a major element in their attack, and, as a matter of elementary 
logic, Price-Anderson may be regarded as nuclear power's Achilles 
heel. It is difficult to argue that the affected public should not be 
deeply concerned about the existence in its backyard of a facility that 
has such immense potential for destruction that it requires the extra-
ordinary protective umbrella of Price-Anderson. Outright repeal of 
Price-Anderson would connote that the risks of nuclear power have 
become manageable, that they are of ordinary proportions, and that 
they can properly be compared with other types of risks that the 
public has become accustomed to accepting. 
Short of repeal of Price-Anderson, lesser changes could be made 
126. Id. at 39-40. 
127. AEC Press Release No. P-333, Oct. 17, 1972, 
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with salutary effects. There is little justification for the present pro-
visions that totally immunize industry from any exposure to liability 
not covered by insurance or indemnity. At the present time, industry 
is protected by 95 million dollars in private insurance, 465 million 
dollars in AEC indemnity, and the absolute cut-off of liability at 
560 million dollars. This structure might be altered in one of two 
ways. Preferably, an industry-liability corridor of perhaps 25 million 
dollars might be established between the private insurance coverage 
and the applicability of the indemnity. Thus, for example, if there 
were public liability in the total amount of 150 million dollars, the 
first 95 million dollars would be covered by insurance, industry 
would be responsible for the next 25 million dollars, and the in-
demnity would cover the remaining 30 million dollars. Alternatively, 
the 25 million dollar corridor might exist after exhaustion of the 
560 million dollar insurance and indemnity but before liability is 
cut off. Thus, if an accident resulted in 600 million dollars liability, 
industry would be at risk for 25 million dollars, and the remaining 
15 million dollars would be cut off by operation of the Price-Ander-
son Act. Under either proposal, the amount of the corridor could be 
increased from time to time to reflect increasing experience and 
confidence. 
These are modest proposals, but would represent a substantial 
improvement. They would reinstate to some degree the deterrent 
effect of potential liability. They would, moreover, compel industry 
to share to some extent the risk presently borne by the public. At 
the same time, the exposure of industry would be finite and ascer-
tainable, and is a risk that industry should be readily willing to bear 
after twenty years of pronouncements that the possibility of an ac-
cident causing such liability is vanishingly small. 
In the past, congressional consideration of the Price-Anderson 
Act and its amendments has proceeded on the tacit assumption that 
Price-Anderson is a technical measure necessary for adequate protec-
tion of the public interest with respect to a technology that exists 
and will inevitably grow substantially. The fact that the technology 
exists and grows only because of Price-Anderson has been artfully 
concealed from public view so that consideration of the indemnity 
legislation would not trigger public debate as to whether nuclear 
power was needed and whether its risks were acceptable. Moreover, 
when the 1965 and 1966 amendments to the Price-Anderson Act 
were enacted, great pains were taken to characterize the risks of 
nuclear power as minimal. It seems strange and quite disingenuous 
that in 1966 the Joint Committee should reject explicit statutory 
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strict liability for nuclear power plants because this "would single 
out the nuclear industry as one for which extraordinary rules of 
liability must be devised."128 After all, the Price-Anderson Act and 
the 1966 amendments themselves singled out the nuclear industry 
and created special rules of liability. 
Nuclear power, and its associated governmental policies, have 
always been regarded as unique and as requiring extraordinary 
public measures. The Price-Anderson Act is perhaps the most extra-
ordinary of these measures. It is remarkable that the atomic energy 
establishment has been so successful in procuring public acceptance 
of nuclear power in view of the extraordinary risks of the technology 
that are so thoroughly and incontrovertibly documented by the mere 
.existence of that Act. It is necessary, however, as nuclear power ca-
pacity grows, as nuclear power becomes more commonplace, as con-
cern with environmental values increases, that steps be taken to 
normalize all aspects of nuclear power. The opportunity exists for 
some first steps in this direction when Congress considers what should 
be done when Price-Anderson expires in 1977. 
128. See text accompanying note 87 supra: 
